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III.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
This is an appeal of an Order of the Third District Court of
Salt

Lake

granting

County,

defendants1

State

of Utah,

Motion

dated

to Dismiss.

September

16, 1991

This appeal also

challenges the subsequent Order of the same court dated September
27,

1991 dismissing

this case.

The Utah Supreme Court has

jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §782-2(3)(j) (1953) as amended.
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IV.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether a beneficiary to a trust may be a proper party

to bring a suit for violation of the trust agreement against
third parties.

The allegations in plaintiff's Complaint must be

taken as true.

The trial court's ruling should be affirmed only

if it is clear that plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any
state of facts which could be proved in support of her claim.
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1990).
2.

Whether the trustee of a trust is an indispensible party

to an action for violation of the trust agreement against third
parties.

The allegations in plaintiff's Complaint must be taken

as true.

The trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it

is clear that plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any state
of facts which could be proved in support of her claim.

Colman

v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1990).
3. Whether plaintiff's claims against third parties were
barred by the statute of limitations when plaintiff did not learn
of her cause of action until December, 1990.

The allegations in

plaintiff's Amended Complaint must be taken as true.
in

opposition

to

Plaintiff

submitted

affidavits

defendants' Motion to

Dismiss.

The affidavits were not excluded by the court, thus

converting the motion to one treated as a summary judgment motion
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The

Court must view the facts on the second motion to dismiss in the
8

light most favorable to the losing party, the plaintiff.

Themy

v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979).
The Court should review the trial courts view of the law for
correctness.

Ron

Case Roofing

and Asphalt

Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).

9

Paving, Inc. v.

V.
DETERMINATIVE RULES
The determinative rules in this case are as follows:
Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

Rule 19(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2)
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If
he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or,
in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue
and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be
dismissed from the action.
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Rule 56(b) & (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
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VI.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

This action was filed in the Third District Court of

Salt Lake County, State of Utah by Anna Lee Anderson as plaintiff
on the 6th day of December,

1990.

Plaintiff sought damages

against defendants for breach of contract, tortious interference
with contract, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.

(Rec. 1

- 12) .
2.

Defendants

Complaint

on the

12(b)(6)-(7) and

filed

a

Motion

15th day of April,

to

Dismiss

plaintifffs

1991 pursuant to Rules

19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(Rec.

40) .
3.

Judge J. Dennis Frederick granted defendants1 Motion to

Dismiss without oral argument on the 16th day of July, 1991.
(Rec. 91).
4.

Prior to the execution and entry of the Order granting

defendants'

Motion

to

Dismiss,

plaintiff

filed

an

Amended

Complaint naming David M. Dudley, Trustee of the Norman Anderson
Trust as plaintiff with the same causes of action alleged against
defendants.
5.
Complaint

(Rec. 92 -104).

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Amended
on

the

7 th

day

of August,

1991 pursuant

12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
6.

to Rule

(Rec. 139).

After hearing on September 16, 1991, Judge J. Dennis

Frederick granted defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

12

(Rec. 213).

VII.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about November 20, 1978, Norman Anderson executed

a Trust Agreement which created the Norman Anderson Trust. (Rec.
2, para. 5).
2.

On or about November 28, 1978, Plaintiff Anna Lee

Anderson executed a Trust Agreement which created the Anna Lee
Anderson Trust. (Rec. 2, para. 6).
3.
both

In addition, during the approximate same period of time,

Norman

Anderson

and

Anna

Lee

Anderson

executed

their

respective Last Wills and Testaments. (Rec. 3, para. 7).
4.

Shortly after the execution by Norman Anderson of the

Trust Agreement establishing the Norman Anderson Trust, Norman
Anderson transferred certain property into said Trust.

Included

in such transfer were 20,500 shares of the common stock of Levi
Strauss & Co.
5.

(Rec. 3, para. 8).

James

Anderson's

N.

Anderson,

Norman

son, was designated

Anderson

and

Anna

Lee

by the Norman Anderson Trust

Agreement as the Trustee for such Trust.

(Rec. 3, para. 9; Rec.

146, para. 2; Rec. 152, para. 4).
6.

That Anna Lee Anderson is the sole Beneficiary of the

Norman Anderson Trust (Rec. 147, para. 2).
7.

On

or

about

November

20,

1978,

Norman

Anderson

established an account with Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
at its Salt Lake City office. (Rec. 3, para. 10).
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8.

Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. was furnished a

copy of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement at the time such
Trust Account was opened with Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc.

(Rec. 3, para. 11; Rec. 147, para. 4).
9.

Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. forwarded a copy of

the Norman Anderson

Trust Agreement

to

its trust

department

located at the regional office of Dean Witter Reynolds in San
Francisco, California.
10.

The

Francisco,

Dean

(Rec. 3, para. 12).

Witter

California

Reynolds

reviewed

trust

said

Trust

department
Agreement

in

San

and set

directives to the Salt Lake City office of Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. with respect to the handling by Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
of the Norman Anderson Trust.
11.

(Rec. 3-4, para. 13).

The Norman Anderson Trust Agreement, provides for the

creation upon the death of Norman Anderson of two trusts, namely,
a "Marital Trust" and a "Family Trust".
12.

(Rec. 4, para. 14).

The provisions of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement

direct the Trustee, and third parties dealing with the Trustee,
with respect to the maintenance, administration, management and
distribution of assets held in said Trust.
13.

(Rec. 4, para. 15).

The Marital Trust requires the Trustee to distribute

income from the Marital Trust to Anna Lee Anderson on at least a
quarterly basis.
14.

(Rec. 4, para. 16).

In addition, the Marital Trust allows the Trustee to

make distributions of principal to Anna Lee Anderson for her
14

care, comfort, support and maintenance including the purchase of
residences.
15.

(Rec. 4, para. 17).

The Marital Trust also provides that the Trustee may

make distributions

of principal

writing by Anna Lee Anderson.
16.

The

Family

to any person

designated

in

(Rec. 4, para. 18).

Trust

allows

the

Trustee

to

make

distributions of principal to Anna Lee Anderson, provided income
from

all

other

insufficient

sources

(including

the

Marital

Trust)

are

for her care, comfort, support and maintenance.

(Rec. 5, para. 19).
17.

The Family Trust provides for the distribution of the

balance of the Family Trust assets after Anna Lee Anderson's
death.

(Rec. 5, para. 20).

18.

On

or

about May

8, 1990, Defendant Ralph Pahnke

prepared a letter on the letterhead of Defendant Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. which provided

for the distribution of 41,000

shares of the common stock of Levi Strauss & Co. as follows:
a.

24,118

shares

were

distributed

to

the

personal

securities account at Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. of James N.
Anderson;
b.

16,882 shares were distributed to the Anna Lee Anderson

Trust Account at Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

(Rec. 5, para. 21;

Rec. 147, para. 5).
19.

The value of the Levi Strauss & Co. stock distributed

to James N. Anderson amount to $871,238.63. (Rec. 5, para. 22).
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20.

The value of the Levi Strauss & Co. stock distributed

to the Anna Lee Anderson Trust amounted to $609,845.36. (Rec. 5,
para. 23).
21.

Neither of the distributions were in accordance with

the provisions, terms and conditions of the Norman Anderson Trust
Agreement which was in the possession of Defendant Pahnke and
Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (Rec. 5, para. 24; Rec. 153,
para. 9).
22.

Subsequent to such distributions, Defendant Dean Witter

Reynolds, Inc. continued to manage the Anna Lee Anderson Trust
Account.

During

management

of

valueless.

(Rec. 5, para. 25).

23.

the terms of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s

such

Trust

Account,

the

Trust

Account

became

The distributions induced by and affected by Defendant

Pahnke and Defendant Dean Witter Reynolds were unlawful, and in
direct contravention of the provisions of the Norman Anderson
Trust Agreement.
24.

(Rec. 5, para. 25; Rec. 153, para. 9).

James N. Anderson, as Trustee of the Norman Anderson

Trust, never questioned the propriety of the transfers from the
Norman Anderson Trust due to his reliance upon Defendant Pahnke
and

Defendant

Dean

Witter

Reynolds

and

consequently

never

disclosed to the beneficiary, Anna Lee Anderson, the transfer of
those assets until December, 1990.
25.

(Rec. 147-48, para. 6).

The sole beneficiary of the Norman Anderson Trust, Anna

Lee Anderson, never examined a copy of the Norman Anderson Trust
16

until December, 1990.
26.

(Rec. 152, para. 5).

In preparation for an arbitration hearing with respect

to the Anna Lee Anderson Trust in December, 1990, the beneficiary
of the Norman Anderson Trust, Anna Lee Anderson, discovered that
the assets which were supposed to be deposited in the Norman
Anderson Trust had been transferred in direct contravention of
the terms of said trust to the Anna Lee Anderson Trust and the
personal account of James N. Anderson.

(Rec. 153, para. 9; Rec.

155, para. 15).
27.

Upon discovering that the transfer of assets out of the

Norman Anderson Trust was inappropriate, attorneys for the Anna
Lee

Anderson

Trust

attempted

to

have

the

issue

of

the

inappropriate transfer of assets from the Norman Anderson Trust
determined at the pending arbitration hearing, but was advised by
the

arbitrators

proceeding.
28.

to

dispose

of

those

issues

in

a

separate

the

wrongful

(Rec. 153-54, para. 11).
Upon

discovering

in

December,

1990

transfer of assets from the Norman Anderson Trust, Anna Lee
Anderson caused the original Complaint to be filed
District Court in December, 1990.
29.

Subsequent

to

the

in Third

(Rec. 154, para. 12).

conclusion

of

the

arbitration

proceeding dealing with the Anna Lee Anderson Trust, Anna Lee
Anderson

requested

the

resignation

of James N. Anderson

as

Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust and designated David M.
Dudley as Successor Trustee.
30.

(Rec. 154, para. 13).

Had Anna Lee Anderson been aware of any time prior to
17

December, 1990 of the wrongful transfer of assets from the Norman
Anderson Trust, she would have asserted her rights thereunder
immediately.

(Rec. 154, para. 14).
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VIII.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In this case, the original plaintiff, Anna Lee Anderson is
the beneficiary of the Norman Anderson Trust.
Anderson was the trustee of the trust.

Her son, James

In direct violation of

the terms of the trust, James Anderson transferred the bulk of
the trust assets (stocks) to his own personal account which was
managed by Defendants Ralph Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds.
Pahnke was the account executive for not only James Anderson's
personal account, but also for the trust's account.

Both Pahnke

and Dean Witter had been provided copies of the Norman Anderson
Trust and were
therein.

familiar with the limitations

and

conditions

In spite of their knowledge of the impropriety of the

transfer of stock from the Norman Anderson Trust account into
James

Anderson's

personal

account,

Pahnke

and

Dean

Witter

authorized the transfer and participated in the same receiving
commissions therefrom.
Anna Lee Anderson was unaware of this transfer and that it
was in violation of the Norman Anderson Trust.

Immediately upon

learning of the violation, Anna Lee Anderson filed this action
against defendants in December, 1990.
proper

party

neglected
beneficiary

to

plaintiff
bring

may

because

such

bring

an

an

the

action.

action

Anna Lee Anderson was the
trustee,
It

against

is

son,

clear

a third

participates in a breach of trust by the trustee.
19

her

had

that

a

party who

It is also clear that James Anderson is not an indispensible
party in this case.

As stated above, a beneficiary can bring

such an action against third parties when the trustee fails to do
so.

Furthermore, defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter have assumed

the roles of defacto trustees for their participation in the
breach of trust.

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter are certainly

free to bring in James Anderson as a third party defendant should
they deem his presence in the suit necessary.
After plaintiff's original Complaint was dismissed by the
district court, but prior to execution and entry of the Order,
plaintiff

filed an Amended

Complaint naming David M. Dudley,

substituted trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust, as plaintiff.
Defendants then moved to dismiss claiming that plaintiff's claims
were barred by the statute of limitations.

It is clear, however,

that a third party participant in a breach of trust by a trustee
cannot

assert

the

statute

of

limitations

as

a

defense.

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter were knowing participants in
the breach of trust by James Anderson.

They cannot now, as joint

tortfeasors, benefit from the passage of time since the transfer.
Plaintiff acted immediately as soon as she discovered that the
transfer of stocks by James Anderson was in violation of the
Norman Anderson Trust.

Consequently, the district court erred in

dismissing plaintiff's claims.
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IX.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Beneficiary Is A Proper Party To Bring Suit For
A Violation Of The Trust Agreement

It is a generally accepted principle that beneficiaries of a
trust cannot maintain an action against third parties who have
acted adversely to the trust.

Rather, it is well settled that

ordinarily such actions must be maintained by the trustee.

The

Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §281 (1976) provides:
(1) Where the trustee could maintain an action at
law or suit in equity or other proceeding against a
third person if the trustee held the property free
of trust, the beneficiary cannot maintain an action
at law against the third person, except as stated
in Subsection (2).
Similarly, §282 of the Restatement

(Second) of Trusts, (1976)

provides:
(1) Where the trustee could maintain an action at
law or suit in equity or other proceeding against a
third person if the trustee held the property free
of trust, the beneficiary cannot maintain a suit in
equity against the third person, except as stated
in Subsections (2) and (3).
(2) If the trustee improperly refuses or neglects
to bring an action against the third person, the
beneficiary can maintain a suit in equity against
the trustee and the third person.
(3) If the trustee cannot be subjected to the
jurisdiction of the court or if there is no
trustee, the beneficiary can maintain a suit in
equity against the third person, if such suit is
necessary to protect the interest of the
beneficiary.
The theory requiring such actions to be maintained by the trustee
is based upon the presumption that the wrong is actually against
21

the trustee who is responsible for managing the trust estate.
Any wrongful interference with these interests of
the normal trustee is therefore a wrong to the
trustee and gives him a cause of action for redress
or to prevent a continuance of the improper
conduct.
Although the beneficiary is adversely
affected by such acts of a third person, no cause
of action inures to him on that account. The right
to sue in the ordinary case vests in the trustee as
a representative.
G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts And Trustees, §869 at 87 (Rev. 2nd
Ed. 1982).

The cases supporting this position are numerous.

Utah has codified the general rule allowing trustees to
maintain actions on behalf of the trust estate.

"(3) A trustee

has the power . . . to: (z) prosecute or defend actions, claims,
or proceedings for the protection of trust assets and of the
trustee in the performance of his duties; . . . "
§75-7-402(3)(z) (1953) as amended.
this

statute

merely

allows

the

Utah Code Ann.

It is important to note that
trustee

to maintain

certain

actions; it does not preclude the beneficiary from maintaining an
action on behalf of himself or the trust.
As

with

most

general

principles

of

law,

the

foregoing

limitation on the rights of beneficiaries to maintain actions
against third parties is subject to some exceptions.

Such an

exception exists in the present case.
The situation is different where the trustee in
breach of trust transfers property to a third
person. In this situation the third person is not
acting adversely to the trustee, and would have
done no wrong and incurred no liability if the
trustee had held the property free of trust. The
wrong that he commits is a wrong to the
beneficiaries in taking or retaining the property
after he has notice of the breach of trust, and he
thereby incurs a liability to them unless, indeed,
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he is a bona fide purchaser. In this situation,
therefore, the beneficiaries can maintain a suit in
equity against the transferee, if he took with
notice of the breach of trust or paid no value.
IV A. Scott, The Law of Trusts, §294.1 at 99 (4th Ed. 1989).
Indeed, the vast majority of jurisdictions recognize a right of
the beneficiary to initiate and prosecute actions for breach of a
trust agreement.

See, Chicago City Bank & Trust Company v.

Lesman, 542 N.E.2d 824 (111. 1989) (Remainder beneficiaries to a
trust

are

"interested

parties"

who

have

an

interest

in

maintaining the assets of the trust estate, and, as such, may
institute actions for mismanagement of the trust); Fortune v.
First Union National Bank, 371 S.E.2d 483

(N.C. 1988) (Trust

beneficiary may maintain action in his individual capacity for
damages

due

to mismanagement

of trust) ; Edcreworth v.

First

National Bank of Chicago, 677 F.Supp. 982 (S.D.Ind. 1988) (To
extent that

income beneficiary's

claims against officers and

directors of corporation whose stock was held by trust were
premised

on their knowing participation in alleged breach of

fiduciary duty by co-trustees, beneficiary had standing to assert
claims); Hoyle v. Dickinson, 746 P.2d

18 (Ariz. 1987) (trust

Beneficiary may bring action for damages against trustee or third
party for breach of trust agreement); Alioto v. United States,
593 F.Supp. 1402 (N.D.Cal. 1984) (Beneficiary is allowed to bring
action

against

separately
requirement

or

trustee
jointly

that

and
as

constructive

co-defendants,

beneficiary's

action

trustee,
and

against

there

either
is

no

constructive

trustee be premised on beneficiary's inability to recover from
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trustee); Reynolds v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, N.A., 471
S.2d

1238

(Ala. 1982)

(Beneficiaries have standing to invoke

equity jurisdiction to hear action challenging trustee's prudence
in investing common trust funds, even though trustee itself held
legal title to assets in the funds); Velez v. Feinstein, 451
N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. 1982) (Beneficiary may bring action on behalf
of trust due to futility in making demand upon trustee because of
conflict of interest).
The case law in Utah addressing the rights of a beneficiary
to a trust in pursuing an action against third parties is especially sparse.

The only Utah case with remotely similar facts

as the present case is Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemm, 76 Utah
372, 290 P. 161 (1930).

In Salina Canyon, the plaintiff had

brought an action to quiet title to certain property located in
Morgan County.

The acquisition of the property had been arranged

by one Lehman who had been acting on behalf of a mining development

company.

Lehman

Salina Canyon Coal Co.
in the

quiet

subsequently

organized

the plaintiff,

The mining development company intervened

title action

claiming

interest

in the subject

property as the beneficiary of a trust for which Lehman was the
trustee.

Relying upon §6495, Comp. Laws Utah, 1917, the Court

found that the mining development company, as beneficiary to the
trust, was the real party in interest and had a right to sue.
290 P. at 167.

Comp. Laws Utah, 1917, §6495 defined real parties

in interest and appears to be the predecessor of what is now Rule
17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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The Salina Canvon Court

went on to say that

M

[a]ll courts hold a beneficiary under a

trust may sue to protect his rights, especially in a case where
his interests are hostile to those of the trustee*"

Id,

The facts of the instant case are similar to those in Ezell
v, Fletcher, 650 S.W.2d 33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
plaintiffs were beneficiaries
stocks

and

bonds.

of a trust with

The trustee, in violation

agreement, pledged

the

In Ezell, the
owned

certain

of the trust

stocks and bonds as security

for an

obligation of a corporation in favor of defendant Fletcher.

The

trustee of the trust was joined by the defendants as a third
party defendant.

In their complaint, the plaintiffs sought the

return of the stocks and bonds from defendants.
34.

650 S.W.2d at

The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial Court's

judgment granting

the plaintiffs

the relief

sought

in their

complaint finding that the defendants knowingly participated in
the breach of trust and the defendants were therefore liable.
Id. at 36-37.
It is also well established that third parties who participate in a breach of trust are liable to the beneficiary even
though such third parties may not have been transferees of trust
assets.
"[a]

The Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §326 provides that

third

person

who,

although

not

a transferee

of trust

property, has notice that the trustee is committing a breach of
trust and participates therein is liable to the beneficiary for
any loss caused by the breach of trust."
address

the

very

circumstance
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present

The comments to §326
in the present case.

"Thus, if the trustee directs an agent to sell trust property,
which the agent knows the trustee is not authorized to sell, and
he does sell it, he is liable for participation in the breach of
trust."

Id., comment a. at 124.

The liability of a stockbroker

who participates in such a breach of trust is equally clear.
If the broker has notice that the trustee is
committing a breach of trust in making the purchases or sales, he is liable for participation in
the breach of trust. The broker is liable where he
has actual knowledge or where the circumstances
show that the trustee is committing a breach of
trust in making the purchase or sale through the
agency of the broker.
IV A. Scott, The Law of Trusts, §326.2 at 296 (4th Ed. 1989).
See, also, Titcomb v. Billings, Olcott & Co., 104 F.Supp. 168
(S.D. N.Y. 1952); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & SMith Inc. v.
Bocock, 247 F.Supp. 373 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
In

the

present

case,

there

is

no

question

that

James

Anderson, as trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust breached the
terms of the trust transferring the trust assets to his own
account.

There is also no question that Defendants Ralph Pahnke

and Dean Witter Reynolds were aware of the specific terms of the
Norman Anderson Trust, and thus, were aware that James Anderson's
transfer of trust assets was in direct violation of the trust.
As such, Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter were knowing participants in the breach of trust and are therefore liable to the
beneficiary, Anna Lee Anderson.

Given James Anderson's breach of

trust and Defendant Pahnke and Dean Witter's knowing participation therein, Anna Lee Anderson is the only logical choice to
file a claim in this matter.

At the time this action was filed
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James N. Anderson was till the Trustee of the Norman Anderson
Trust.

It

is

clear

that

the

trustee, James Anderson had

certainly neglected to file any actions for the recovery of the
Norman Anderson Trust assets.
In this action, Defendants have attempted

to create an

impossible dilemma for Plaintiff by suggesting that the trustee
is the appropriate party Plaintiff in this action as well as an
indispensible party Defendant.

Common sense clearly tells us

that James Anderson would not file an action on behalf of the
trust for return of the trust assets naming himself as a defendant.

It is clear under the authorities cited above, that there

is not only a recognized right in the beneficiary to bring suit
for a violation

of the trust agreement but, even under the

restricted Restatement view, the beneficiary is the appropriate
party plaintiff in this action.

Consequently Judge Frederick

erred in granting the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
II.

The Trustee Is Not An Indispensible Party To This Action.
A.

Ralph Pahnke And Dean Witter Acted As Defacto
Trustees Of The Norman Anderson Trust.

It is a well established principle of equity that a third
party who participates with a fiduciary in the breach of his duty
to the beneficiary, with knowledge that the fiduciary's intended
actions will violate such obligation or otherwise constitute a
breach of trust, is a participant in the breach of trust himself
and liable therefor to the beneficiary.
Trusts §326 (1976).

Restatement

(Second)

See, also, Seminole Nation v. United States,

316 U.S. 286, 62 S.Ct. 1049, 1054 (1942); Whitney v. Citibank,
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N.A. ,

782

F.2d

1106,

1115-1117

(2d

Cir.

1986).

More

specifically, ". . . one who, even without breaching any duty
owed on his behalf, aids a Trustee in breaching the Trustee's
fiduciary duty . . . may be held liable as a defacto trustee even
if he does not benefit from the breach".

Wisconsin Real Estate

Investment Trust v, Weinstein, 509 F.Supp. 1289, 1300 (E.D. Wis.
1981).

See, also, U.S. v. Rivieccio, 661 F.Supp. 281, 294 (E.D.

N.Y. 1987).
Addressing the third-party obligation of fair dealing when
transacting

business with those holding

a fiduciary

duty to

another, the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Ayer. 101
U.S. 320, 25 L.Ed. 955 (1879), stated:
The law exacts the most perfect good faith from
all parties dealing with a trustee respecting
trust property.
Whoever takes it for an object
other than the general purposes of the trust, or
such as may reasonably be supposed to be within
its scope, must look to the authority of the
trustee, or he will act at his peril.
101 U.S. at 327.

The Smith Court specifically held that a third

party dealing with a trustee and the trust assets, undertakes a
responsibility

to

exercise

reasonable

care

in

ascertaining

limitations which may be imposed upon the trustee regarding the
permissibility of disposition of trust property; and,

H

.

. .

however free from intentional wrong, they must bear the responsibility of mistake in judgment with respect to those limitations".

IcL. at 325.

At common law, non-fiduciary third parties are jointly and
severally liable for inducing a trustee to make dispositions of
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trust property in violation of the trust agreement or law, and
for unlawfully borrowing trust funds.
F.Supp. 1361, 1396 (D. Nev. 1984).

Donovan v. Schmoutey, 592

The requisite elements neces-

sary to establish a knowing participation in breach of fiduciary
duty includes acts or omissions which further or complete the
breach

and

which

are

executed

with

actual

or

constructive

knowledge at the time the transaction became a breach.

Id. at

The common law of trusts imposes particular duties
and obligations on parties which deal with trusts,
including the following.
(a) The law requires of those dealing with a trustee
the exercise of good faith toward the beneficiaries of
the trust . . .
(b) Persons knowingly dealing with trustees are under a
duty of inquiry . . .
Id.

(Citations omitted).
Utah law limits the "duty of inquiry" imposed upon

third persons but continues to impose a duty upon those who have
"actual knowledge" of limitations of the trustee's trust powers.
Utah Code Ann. S75-7-406 provides:
With respect to a third person dealing with a
trustee or assisting a trustee in the conduct of a
transaction, the existence of trust power and
their proper exercise by the trustee may be
assumed without inquiry. The third person is not
bound to inquire whether the trustee has power to
act or is properly exercising the power; and a
third person, without actual knowledge that the
trustee is exceeding his power or improperly
exercising them, is fully protected in the
dealings with a trustee as if the trustee possessed and properly exercised the powers he
purports to exercise. A third person is not bound
to assure the proper application of trust assets
paid or delivered to the trustee.
(Emphasis
added.)
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Defendants have freely admitted that they were in possession of
the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement and that they had read it and
interpreted it.

Having read and interpreted the trust agreement,

Defendants possessed actual knowledge that the transfer of assets
contained in the Norman Anderson Trust was wrongful and in direct
violation of the terms of the trust agreement.
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear whether a broker
may claim protection under Utah Code Ann. §75-7-406 for failure
to

ascertain

the

powers

and

limitations

engaging in business with a trustee.
Supreme

Court

in Utah

of

a trustee when

As stated by the Utah

State University,

et al. v. Sutro &

Company, 646 P.2d 715, (Utah 1982):
It is not to be questioned that [brokers], who are
licensed to render service as brokers, must be
deemed to have and use specialized knowledge,
experience and integrity in rendering that
service; and more specifically, here, that they
have an especially high degree of care to ascertain the authority of a trustee dealing with
public funds.
646 P.2d at 717.

While the foregoing case relates to a broker's

duty of care when dealing with trustees of public funds, the
Court

acknowledged

that

brokers,

due

to

their

specialized

knowledge and experience are under a more particularized duty to
ascertain the powers and limits of trustees with whom they deal.
Inasmuch as Utah Code Ann. §75-7-406 was enacted in 1975, it must
be presumed that the Sutro Court was aware of its existence when
it placed a duty upon brokers to ascertain the authority of a
trustee.

Defendant Pahnke was the trust's broker with special-

ized knowledge and experience and was under a duty to determine
30

the

limitations

of

authority

placed

upon James Anderson

as

trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust.
Having been established as participants in the breach of
trust, Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter are liable for any and
all damages resulting from the breach of trust, even though they
were not the recipients of the particular assets involved in the
wrongful transaction.
party

participants

See, Donovan, 592 F.Supp. at 1396.

in breaches of a fiduciary

Third

duty owed by

another are directly liable for both compensatory damages and
punitive damages.

Whitney v. Citibank, N.A., 782 F.2d 1106 (2d

Cir. 1986).
Because

Defendant

Pahnke

and

Dean

Witter

are

actually

defacto trustees, as set forth above, the action filed by Anna
Lee Anderson was actually
Anderson Trust.

against co-trustees to the Norman

Consequently,

dismissal of Plaintiff's original

complaint was improper.

B.

Plaintiff Is Not Obligated To Join James Anderson
As An Indispensible Party Defendant.

The authorities are substantial that permit a plaintiff to
sue a third party for violation of a trust agreement without
joining the actual trustee.

See, Matter Of Hadleiqh D. Hyde

Trust, 458 N.W.2d 802 (S.D. 1990) (Co-trustee permitted defendant
co-trustee to handle operation of trusts, including investments,
and co-trustee was unaware of mismanagement by defendant. Defendant was not entitled to surcharge co-trustee for any amounts that
defendant

was

required

to pay the trust);
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Alioto v. United

States, 593 F.Supp. 1402 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Beneficiary may bring
action

against

trustee

and

constructive

trustee,

either

separately or jointly as co-defendants, and there is no requirement that beneficiary's action against constructive trustee be
premised on beneficiary's inability to recover from trustee);
Reiner v, Kelly, 457 N.E.2d 946 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (Generally,
trustee is not liable for wrongful acts of co-trustee).

More-

over, the authorities are additionally numerous in situations
where there is joint and several liability of tortfeasors, as in
the present case, and the law does not impose a duty upon the
plaintiff to sue joint tortfeasors.

See, Smith v. State Farm

Fire & Casualty Company, 633 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1980) (Where
insured, as owner of life estate and property, brought suit to
recover for fire loss after insured's refusal to pay on policy,
and was involved in voluntary bankruptcy proceedings at the time
of the loss; the failure to join insured's trustee in bankruptcy
was appropriate); Burnette v. Grant Mutual Casualty Company, 311
F.Supp. 873

(E.D. Tenn. 1970)

(Where persons are jointly and

severally liable, one may bring an action against insuror without
joining the other).
In Struble v. N.J. Brewery Emp. Welfare Trust Fund, 732
F.2d 325 (3rd Cir. 1984), suit was brought by former employees
against

former

employers,

Employees

Welfare

Trust

Fund

and

trustees of the Fund alleging various violations of the trust as
well as a breach of the trustee's fiduciary duties.

The Third

Circuit held that multiple trustees who are at fault may be held
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jointly and severally liable but that the union trustees were not
indispensible parties.

In so holding, the Court stated:

We also reject the argument that the Union
Trustees are indispensible parties to this action.
Cases cited by the defendants consider whether the
trustees are indispensible to an action alleging
violations of the trust agreement. These cases do
not require, however, that the plaintiff name all
of the Trustees as defendants.
It is a wellestablished principle of trust law that multiple
trustees who are at fault may be held jointly and
severally liable.
If the Union Trustees are at
fault, the defendants may join them.
732 F.2d at 332.

(Citations omitted).

(Emphasis in original).

As in Struble, should defendants believe that James Anderson
is liable for breach of trust as trustee of the Norman Anderson
Trust, they are free to join him as a third-party defendant in
the present action.
Anderson
dismissal

is
of

an

However, defendants1 contention that James

indispensible

this

action,

party

whose

is without

merit

absence
and

requires

plaintiff's

original complaint was improperly dismissed.

III.

Plaintiff's Claims Are Timely Filed

Immediately upon learning of the improper transfer of assets
from the Norman Anderson Trust, the original Plaintiff, Anna Lee
Anderson, filed the present proceeding in December, 1990.

(Rec.

154, para. 12). Judge Frederick found, however, that Plaintiff's
claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges causes of action for breach
of

contract,

tortious

interference

fiduciary duty and negligence.
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with

contract,

breach of

Defendants claimed that even

under the longest possible statute of limitations, six years
pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Ann.

§78-12-23(2)

(1953)

as

Plaintiff's Complaint would still be time barred.
Frederick

and

defendants

failed

to

recognize,

amended,

Both Judge

however, that

plaintiff did not discover his potential causes of action until
December, 1990, when the beneficiary, Anna Lee Anderson, learned
of the wrongful transfers of trust assets by the trustee, James
N. Anderson.
It is well established that "a cause of action does not
accrue and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
the

plaintiff

learns

of

or

in

the

exercise

of

reasonable

diligence should have learned of the facts which give rise to the
cause of action."
1990).

Klincrer v. Kightly, 792 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah

Indeed, in the present case, Anna Lee Anderson, the

beneficiary of the Norman Anderson Trust, was unaware of the
essential

facts

December, 1990.

giving

rise

to

her

cause

of

action

until

Furthermore, it is clear that the prior trustee

of the Norman Anderson Trust, James Anderson, was also unaware of
the breach of the terms of the Norman Anderson Trust.
48, para. 6).

(Rec. 147-

Even if James Anderson had been aware of the

breach of the Trust, it is clear that the beneficiary and her
successor

trustee

would

not

be barred

because

of

Defendant

Pahnke's and Defendant Dean Witter's knowing participation in the
breach of the Trust.

This policy is set out in the Restatement

(Second) of Trusts, § 327.
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(2)
If the third person
knowingly
participated in a breach of trust, the
beneficiary is not precluded from maintaining
an action against him therefore, unless:
(a)
the beneficiary
laches, or;

is himself guilty of

(b) a co-trustee who did not participate in
the breach of trust, or a successor trustee
knowing of the claim against the third person,
fails to bring an action against him until he
is barred by the Statute of Limitations or by
laches.
Restatement

(Second) of Trust, § 327 at 126.

Thus, "where the

trustee transfers trust property in breach of Trust to a third
person who has actual knowledge of the breach of Trust, it is
clear that the beneficiaries will not be barred by the lapse of
time merely because the trustee is barred."

IV A. Scott, The Law

of Trusts, § 327.2 at 326 (4th Ed. 1989) and cases cited therein.
The comment

on Subsection

(2) of the Restatement

(Second) of

Trusts, §327 similarly provides that
If a third person knowingly participates in the
breach of trust, the beneficiary is not barred from
maintaining a suit against him merely because the
trustee is barred. The beneficiary will be barred
if, but only if, he is himself guilty of laches.
Thus, the beneficiary will not be barred if he is
under an incapacity or ordinarily if he did not
know of the breach of trust.
Id. at 127-28.
Numerous

cases have

similarly

held

that

the

statute of

limitations shall not be a bar in actions against third parties
who had participated with the trustee in a breach of trust.
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In

Skinner v. DeKalb Federal Savings & Loan, 246 Ga. 561, 272 S.E.2d
260 (1980), the plaintiffs had filed suit against the defendant
savings and loan association who had allegedly participated in
the breach of trust by the plaintiffs1 mother.

The trial court

had granted defendant summary judgment on the grounds that the
plaintiffs1 claims were barred the statute of limitations.

In

reversing the lower court, the Georgia Supreme Court agreed that
11

[t]he general rule is that when the trustee is barred by the

statute of limitation from pursuing a claim, the beneficiaries of
a

trust

are

barred

also."

272

S.E.2d

at

262. The Court

concluded, however, that "[t]he rule is otherwise where the third
party against whom the trust has a claim knowingly participated
with the trustee in the breach of the trust."

Id.

See, also.

Hammons v. National Surety Co., 287 P. 292 (Ariz. 1930); State
Bank & Trust Co. v. Commercial Trust & Sav. Bank, 300 Ill.App.
435, 21 N.E.2d 157 (1939); American Nat. Bank of Enid v. Crews,
126 P.2d 733 (Okla. 1942); Baldwin v. Taplin, 34 A.2d 117 (Vt.
1943); Connelly v. Florida Nat. Bank of Jacksonville, 120 So.2d
647 (Fla. 1960); Jones v. State, 432 P.2d 420 (Idaho 1967).
In the present case, the uncontroverted affidavits of Anna
Lee Anderson and James Anderson clearly indicate that Defendants
Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds had actual notice of the contents
of the Norman Anderson Trust.

It is further clear that Defendant

Pahnke and Dean Witter Reynolds were very well aware that the
May, 1980 transfer of assets from the Norman Anderson Trust was
in direct contravention of the specific terms of said trust.
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Despite

their

knowledge

of the express terms of the trust,

Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter nevertheless participated in
the breach of trust and profited therefrom.
original

Complaint

transfer

of

immediately upon

assets

from

the

Norman

Plaintiff filed the

learning of the wrongful
Anderson

Trust.

Given

defendants1 clear knowledge of the terms of the trust, and their
knowing participation in the wrongful transfer of trust assets,
defendants

cannot

limitations.

now

claim

the

benefit

of the

statute of

Consequently, the district court erred in granting

defendants1 summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's Amended
Complaint.
X.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it is clear that Anna Lee Anderson, as
beneficiary of the Norman Anderson Trust, was the proper party to
bring the present action against the defendants.

James Anderson,

the trustee of the trust, had breached the trust in transferring
trust assets to his own account.

Furthermore, James Anderson had

not, and was not going to file suit on behalf of the trust.
Consequently, it was improper for the district court to dismiss
plaintiff's Complaint and this Court should therefore reverse the
district court and remand this case for further proceedings.
It

is

further

clear

that

indispensible party to this action.

James

Anderson

is

not

an

Defendants Pahnke and Dean

Witter participated in James Anderson's breach of trust.

Their

participation gave them the status of defacto trustees and proper
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party defendants.

If Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter wanted to

assert claims against James Anderson, they could have brought him
in as a third party defendant.

It was therefore improper for the

district court to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint on the grounds of
failure to join an indispensible party and this Court should
therefore reverse the district court and remand this case for
further proceedings.
Finally, it is well established that a knowing participant
in a breach of trust cannot raise the statute of limitations as a
bar against the beneficiary of the trust who is not guilty of
laches.

In this case it is clear that Anna Lee Anderson acted

swiftly in filing this action once she learned that there had
been a wrongful transfer of assets from the Norman Anderson
trust.

Consequently,

defendants

summary

the

judgment

district
on the

court
grounds

erred
that

in granting
plaintiff's

claims were barred by the statute of limitations and this Court
should therefore reverse the district court and remand this case
for further proceedings.
Z7fa day of January, 1992.
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Plaintiff/

Joseph J. Palmer (no. 2505), and
Reid E. Lewis (no. 1951), of
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915
Telephone: (801) 521-0250

Third Judicial District

SEP 1 6 1991
LAKECObNTY

Py.

Attorneys for Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
and Ralph Pahnke

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ANNA LEE ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC.,
a foreign corporation,
RALPH PAHNKE and
JOHN DOES I THROUGH XXV,

Civil No. 900907186CN
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. and Ralph Pahnke filed a
Motion to Dismiss, dated April 15, 1991.

The motion was decided

by the Court upon receipt of a Notice to Submit, filed July 10,
1991.

Based upon the record, and for good cause shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The Motion to Dismiss is granted.

2.

This action is hereby dismissed pursuant to Rules

12(b)(6)-(7) and 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for
failure of plaintiff to state a claim against Dean Witter

mw rtlorderdwr 719 91

CKl(iv^l4

Reynolds, Inc. and Ralph Pahnke upon which relief can be granted,
and for failure of plaintiff to join the trustee of the Norman
Anderson Trust as an indispensable party to this proceeding.
. 1991.

DATED:

BY THE COURT:

By
nnis Frederick
Judge

mw.relorder dwr 7-19-91
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 19 day of July, 1991, a
copy of the Order was hand-delivered to:
James E. Morton
Paul Hatch
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
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IrV.

Joseph J. Palmer (no. 2505), and
Reid E. Lewis (no. 1951), of
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915
Telephone: (801) 521-0250
Attorneys for Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
and Ralph Pahnke
f# fHE tHIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUMT TOR SMX

LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH
ANNA LEE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC.,
a foreign corporation,
RALPH PAHNKE and
JOHN DOES I THROUGH XXV,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:

ORDER

Civil No. 900907186CN
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

:

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. and Ralph Pahnke filed a
Motion to Dismiss, dated August 6, 1991.

The motion was heard by

the Court, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding, on
September 16, 1991.

Plaintiff was represented by James E. Morton

of Thompson, Morton, Hatch & Skeen.

Defendants were represented

by Reid E. Lewis and E. Jay Sheen of Moyle & Draper, P.C.

Based

upon the record, upon argument, and for good cause shown,

mb relorder dw2

u •:>();% m

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The Motion to Dismiss is granted•

2.

This action is hereby dismissed.

DATED:

September

jnlfr^991.
BY THE* COURT:

Dennis Frederick
Judge

mb. reL order.dw2

Goodie

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September / ( , 1991, a copy
of the Order was hand-delivered to:
James E. Morton
Paul Hatch
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
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